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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the 
order of the District Court dated May 21, 1999 granting the 
Petition of Martin Daniel Appel for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
The District Court granted the writ of habeas corpus after 
it determined that Appel had been constructively denied his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in violation of the 
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Cronic, 466 
U.S. 648 (1984). The District Court vacated Appel's 
conviction and sentence, but stayed execution of the writ 
for 180 days in order to permit the Commonwealth to 
provide Appel a new trial within that time. 
 
I. 
 
FACTS 
 
The parties agree that the District Court's Memorandum 
and Order of May 21, 1999 accurately sets forth the factual 
background, and we will accordingly accept these facts as 
accurate and summarize them here, supplemented by other 
uncontested facts of record. 
 
On June 6, 1986, Appel and Stanley Hertzog, pursuant 
to a prearranged plan, robbed the First National Bank of 
Bath in East Allen Township, Pennsylvania. Appel killed 
two tellers and a bank official, and both r obbers shot at 
others, injuring two other persons. Appel and Hertzog were 
arrested later that day and charged with murder, robbery, 
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and related crimes. On June 9, 1986, while being held in 
prison, Appel confessed to certain law enfor cement officers.1 
 
On June 10, 1986, Appel filed an application for 
appointment of counsel with the Public Defender . It is the 
period between June 10, 1986 and June 20, 1986 that is 
critical to the writ of habeas corpus. On June 10, 1986, the 
Public Defender assigned Ellen Kraft and Lor enzo Crowe to 
serve as Appel's attorneys and they enter ed appearances on 
Appel's behalf. When Kraft and Crowe visited Appel in the 
Northampton County Prison on June 11, 1986, however , 
Appel immediately told them that he did not want them to 
serve as his attorneys. Kraft later testified that Appel had 
only requested a Public Defender after being told that he 
would need a lawyer in order to receive visitors while he 
was in that prison. 
 
Kraft and Crowe nevertheless accompanied Appel to a 
hearing before the trial judge on June 12, 1986. During 
that hearing, the trial judge referred to Kraft and Crowe as 
Appel's "counsel" and they did not dispute this 
characterization. At the hearing, Appel told the judge, "I 
would like to represent myself. I feel I am best able to 
project my own thoughts and express my desires speaking 
for myself in the case." App. II at 14. After being told the 
charges against him and the possible penalties he faced, 
Appel again told the judge, "My choice is to r epresent 
myself. I have no objection to [Kraft and Cr owe] as 
advisors." App. II at 32-33. He explained that having 
counsel would "slow down the wheels of justice, the 
prosecution's case against me." App. II at 33. The judge did 
not accept Appel's waiver of counsel at that time, stating 
that before he did so, he would order Appel to undergo a 
psychiatric examination in order to assist the judge in 
determining Appel's competency to waive counsel. 
 
On June 17, 1986, Appel was examined by Dr. Janet 
Schwartz, a psychiatrist on the staff of Northampton 
County Mental Health and Mental Retardation Unit. Before 
that examination, Dr. Schwartz met with John Weaver, a 
social worker on that staff, who had interviewed Appel 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The record before us shows no details of this confession, and it is not 
at issue. 
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following the crime and had received fr om him some 
background information. Dr. Schwartz received no 
information from either Kraft or Cr owe and, after spending 
an hour with Appel, found Appel to be competent to waive 
his right to counsel. Dr. Schwartz's r eport to the court 
stated, "Mr. Appel appears to have made a rational and well 
thought out decision that he would like to r eceive the death 
penalty and would like this to occur as soon as possible. 
On the basis of my examination I feel that he is competent 
to make this decision and to refuse counsel." App. II at 154. 
On appeal, Appel makes the point that his competency 
evaluation was only Dr. Schwartz's second competency 
evaluation in a felony case, and her first capital one. She 
was, however, board certified in psychiatry and neurology. 
 
The judge held a second hearing on June 20, 1986. The 
judge questioned Appel again, and Appel repeated his 
intention to proceed without an attorney. Kraft and Crowe 
were present at this hearing, but pr ovided no information 
relevant to Appel's competency and specifically advised the 
court in response to its inquiry that they had nothing to 
put on the record at that time. They did not challenge the 
psychiatrist's conclusion. The judge then accepted Appel's 
waiver of counsel based on Dr. Schwartz's r eport and 
appointed Kraft and Crowe as standby counsel pursuant to 
Pa. R. Crim. P. 318(d) (renumber ed Rule 121(D) and 
amended March 1, 2000, effective April 1, 2001).2 
 
Appel pled guilty on July 20, 1986 to three counts of 
criminal homicide, two counts of attempted homicide, one 
count of robbery, two counts of aggravated assault and 
various other charges. See Commonwealth v. Appel, 517 Pa. 
529, 533, 539 A.2d 780, 781 (1988) (hereafter Appel I). 
Under Pennsylvania law, following the defendant's plea of 
guilty to criminal homicide, the court fixes the degree of 
guilt after a hearing. In Appel's case, the hearing was held 
August 7 through August 9, 1986. At that hearing, Appel 
reiterated his waiver of counsel and stated, inter alia, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Pa. R. Crim. P. 318(d) stated, "When the defendant's waiver of counsel 
is accepted, standby counsel may be appointed for the defendant. 
Standby counsel shall attend the proceedings and shall be available to 
the defendant for consultation and advice." 
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       I would like to state for the record, that during the 
       entire proceedings and/or hearings in this matter, I 
       have been very much aware of what is going on. That 
       is to say, I am rational, sane, competent and alert. I 
       have had plenty of opportunities to discuss and 
       consult with stand-by counsel, Mr. Cr owe and Ms. 
       Kraft. And I have consulted with them on various 
       occasions. 
 
       I feel that by cooperating with the prosecution and by 
       pleading guilty to all charges, that I have done the 
       honorable thing. And, I hope that I have set a 
       precedent here today for all futur e defendants in so 
       doing. 
 
       The only mitigating factors that I wish to enter into the 
       record, would be: 
 
       One, that I have had no prior felony convictions 
       against me; and, 
 
       Two, that I was gainfully employed at the time of my 
       arrest. 
 
       I would also like to say that I will not appeal your 
       decision or any decisions that you made. Further more, 
       I trust that the American Civil Liberties Union will not 
       interfere with this matter and that no other outside 
       legal aid groups will make any appeal [on] my behalf. 
 
Commonwealth v. Appel, 547 Pa. 171, 182, 689 A.2d 891, 
896 (1997) (brackets in original) (quoting Degr ee of Guilt 
Hearing Tr. 8/9/86, at 367) (her eafter Appel II). 
 
The trial court found Appel guilty of three counts of first 
degree murder for the deaths of the thr ee bank employees. 
See id. 
 
On August 19, 1986, after the degree of guilt hearing, 
Appel was examined at the request of Kraft and Crowe by 
Dr. Paul Kenneth Gross, another psychiatrist. Dr. Gross 
found "no evidence of any psychosis, sever e depression, 
agitation or paranoia," App. II at 71, and stated in his 
written report that there was "no evidence that [Appel] was 
suffering from any mental disease or defect at the time of 
the crime and that, at that time, he was fully awar e of his 
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behavior, could appreciate the natur e and quality of it, and 
knew the wrongfulness of his behavior." App. II at 71. 
 
At sentencing, Appel again waived his right to counsel 
and requested that he be sentenced to death. The court 
imposed three sentences of death on September 3, 1986. 
Appel did not file any post-verdict motions but the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed Appel's conviction 
and sentence based on an automatic direct r eview, see 42 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 9711(h), and affir med, finding that 
"the evidence supports beyond a reasonable doubt the trial 
court's findings that defendant was guilty of thr ee counts of 
first degree murder." Appel I, 517 Pa. at 536, 539 A.2d at 
783. 
 
Governor Tom Ridge signed Appel's death warrant on 
February 28, 1995, which set the execution date for the 
week of April 4, 1995. However, shortly after the death 
warrant was signed, Appel requested counsel andfiled a 
petition under Pennsylvania's Post-Conviction Relief Act 
("PCRA"), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 9541 et seq., in which 
Appel argued, among other things, that he was mentally ill 
and incompetent during the 1986 proceedings r esulting in 
his guilty plea and death sentence, and that he was denied 
effective assistance of counsel during the 1986 proceedings. 
 
The PCRA trial court conducted hearings from May 6 to 
19, 1995. At these hearings, Appel presented a number of 
psychologists and physicians who examined Appel eight or 
nine years after the murders. They testified that he had 
suffered from Graves' disease, a for m of hyperthyroidism, 
during the summer of 1986. This condition is characterized 
by an enlarged thyroid, a rapid pulse, and increased 
metabolism due to excessive thyroid secr etion. Appel's 
experts testified that the Graves' disease caused him to 
become paranoid and delusional. He told them that the 
bank robbery had been part of a CIA mission to eliminate 
CIA "moles" and that he was bound to keep his mission 
secret. Appel had also repeatedly told them that he was 
part of a "special operations" unit of the military. See, e.g., 
PCRA Tr. 5/6/95, at 23-37 (testimony of Dr. James 
Merikangas); PCRA Tr. 5/8/95, at 355-73 (testimony of Dr. 
Henry Dee); PCRA Tr. 5/12/95, at 35-42 (testimony of Dr. 
Frank Dattilio); PCRA Tr. 5/16/95, at 20-55 (testimony of 
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Dr. Jethro Toomer). Appel's mother , girlfriend, and other 
acquaintances corroborated that Appel had acted strangely 
in 1986. 
 
In support of Appel's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, which Appel based on the failure of Kraft and Crowe 
to investigate Appel's mental illness in 1986 that allegedly 
would have led them to discover his mental illness from his 
family, friends, and employment records, Appel presented 
Kraft and Crowe as witnesses at the PCRA hearing. They 
testified that they did not consider themselves to be Appel's 
counsel at either the June 12, 1986 or June 20, 1986 
hearings, and never considered themselves to be his 
counsel. Kraft testified that "Mr. Appel waived counsel from 
day one." PCRA Tr. 5/12/95, at 162 (testimony of Ellen 
Kraft). She stated that they refrained fr om investigating 
Appel's background because "we were not his attorneys." 
PCRA Tr. 5/12/95, at 165. Crowe also testified that no 
investigation was made because "[w]e wer e, I felt that we 
were standby counsel. I didn't think [investigation] was 
necessary." PCRA Tr. 5/15/95, at 9 (testimony of Lorenzo 
Crowe). 
 
The Commonwealth introduced evidence that Appel's 
motive for the robbery was to get money fast, and that he 
had rational reasons for wanting to plead guilty and be 
executed. Specifically, the Commonwealth intr oduced 
excerpts of an interview Appel gave in 1987 for a television 
documentary entitled "In the Mind of a Mur derer," in which 
he admitted that his motive for the crimes was to get 
money and kill potential witnesses. The Commonwealth 
also introduced a transcript of a taped interview with Appel 
in 1993 in which he explained that he robbed the bank to 
get money for his girlfriend, sought the death penalty so 
that she could get the insurance proceeds, enjoyed being in 
control of the court proceedings and assisting the 
Commonwealth, and got the idea to use Graves' disease as 
the basis of an appeal from a former death row inmate. See 
Appel II, 547 Pa. at 195, 689 A.2d at 902-03. 
 
The trial court denied Appel's PCRA petition on June 14, 
1995. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court later affirmed this 
denial. See Appel II, 547 Pa. 171, 689 A.2d 891. Appel then 
filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 
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U.S.C. S 2254 in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The District Court granted 
the writ on May 21, 1999, but stayed the execution of the 
writ for 180 days in order to permit the Commonwealth to 
provide Appel a new trial. See Appel v. Hor n, No. 97-2809 
(E.D. Pa. May 21, 1999) (hereafter "District Court 
Memorandum").3 The Commonwealth filed a timely appeal. 
 
II. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
A. Standard of Review 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the District Court erred 
in failing to apply the standards contained in the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), 
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). Because 
Appel's habeas petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the 
effective date of AEDPA, AEDPA applies here. 
 
AEDPA precludes habeas relief on a"claim that was 
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" 
unless the petitioner has shown that the state court 
proceedings "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
Federal law, as determined by the Supr eme Court of the 
United States; or . . . resulted in a decision that was based 
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 
the evidence presented in the State court pr oceeding." 28 
U.S.C. S 2254(d). Factual issues that the state court 
determined are presumed to be corr ect, and the burden is 
on the petitioner to rebut that presumption by clear and 
convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e)(1). AEDPA 
"increases the deference federal courts must give to the 
factual findings and legal determinations of the state 
courts." Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 196 (3d Cir. 2000), 
cert. denied, 2001 WL 185125 (U.S. April 16, 2001). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The District Court's opinion is unpublished and appears in App. I as 
Exhibit A. It will be referred to her e as "District Court Memorandum" 
with the appropriate page citation. 
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The Supreme Court recently clarified how these 
standards should be interpreted in its decision in Williams 
v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), wher e it considered a 
federal habeas claim in which petitioner Williams 
contended that he was denied effective assistance of 
counsel. With respect to legal deter minations made by the 
state court, the Williams Court explained that the "contrary 
to" and "unreasonable application" clauses in S 2254(d)(1) 
should be viewed independently. Id. at 405. A state court 
decision will be "contrary to" Supreme Court precedent if it 
is "substantially different from the relevant precedent." Id. 
A state court decision will be an "unreasonable application" 
if (1) "the state court identifies the corr ect governing legal 
rule from [the] Court's cases but unr easonably applies it to 
the facts of the particular state prisoner's case"; or (2) "the 
state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle 
from our precedent to a new context wher e it should not 
apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a 
new context where it should apply." Id.  at 407. The Court 
held that Williams was entitled to habeas r elief because the 
state supreme court's decision was both "contrary to" and 
involved an "unreasonable application" of federal law clearly 
established in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 
(1984). Much of the inquiry since Williams  has focused on 
the application of one or both of these clauses. See, e.g., 
Werts, 228 F.3d 178. 
 
However, by its own terms S 2254(d) applies only to 
claims already "adjudicated on the merits in State court 
proceedings." It follows that when, although properly 
preserved by the defendant, the state court has not reached 
the merits of a claim thereafter presented to a federal 
habeas court, the deferential standards pr ovided by AEDPA 
and explained in Williams do not apply. See Weeks v. 
Angelone, 176 F.3d 249, 258 (4th Cir . 1999), aff 'd, 528 
U.S. 225 (2000) ("When a petitioner has pr operly presented 
a claim to the state court but the state court has not 
adjudicated the claim on the merits, however , our review of 
questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact is de 
novo."); Fisher v. Texas, 169 F .3d 295, 300 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(declining to apply S 2254(d)'s deferential standards 
because the Texas state courts had dismissed petitioner's 
claim on procedural grounds rather than on its merits); 
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Moore v. Parke, 148 F.3d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 1998) ("A 
prerequisite for applying [S 2254(d)] is that the state court 
adjudicated the issue before us on the merits."). 
 
In such an instance, the federal habeas court must 
conduct a de novo review over pure legal questions and 
mixed questions of law and fact, as a court would have 
done prior to the enactment of AEDPA. See McCandless v. 
Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir . 1999). However, the 
state court's factual determinations ar e still presumed to be 
correct, rebuttable upon a showing of clear and convincing 
evidence. See 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e)(1). 
 
The District Court recognized that AEDP A was applicable 
to Appel's habeas petition. Because the District Court's 
opinion was filed before the Supreme Court's opinion in 
Williams v. Taylor, the District Court proceeded under the 
interpretation of AEDPA that this court applied in its 
decision in Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion , 171 F.3d 
877 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc). Nevertheless, nothing in 
Williams would change the District Court's determination 
that the AEDPA deference standard is inapplicable in 
Appel's habeas proceeding. 
 
The District Court first determined that"the claim at the 
center of Appel's habeas petition, [i.e.] that he was 
constructively denied his Sixth Amendment right to the 
assistance of counsel during the time before the trial court 
accepted his waiver of counsel," was presented to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court and therefor e Appel 
exhausted his state court remedies. District Court 
Memorandum at 12. In fact, the Pennsylvania Supr eme 
Court expressly recognized that it must r esolve "[w]hether 
Appel is entitled to relief because he was denied assistance 
of counsel during the original trial court pr oceedings." 
Appel II, 547 Pa. at 184, 689 A.2d at 897. However, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's analysis of this claim always 
characterized the claim as alleging ineffective assistance of 
counsel, and not constructive denial of counsel. The two 
claims, of course, are different. The claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel must be evaluated from a federal 
constitutional basis under the standards set forth in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The 
constructive denial of counsel analysis, on the other hand, 
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stems from the Supreme Court's decision in United States 
v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). 
 
In rejecting Appel's PCRA petition, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court described Appel's claim as one for 
ineffective assistance of counsel asserting that his "stand- 
by counsel were deficient because they: (1) did not 
investigate Appel's background; (2) spoke to no one who 
knew Appel; (3) did not obtain records about Appel; and (4) 
provided no information about Appel's alleged history of 
mental illness to the court-appointed psychiatric experts or 
to the court itself." Appel II, 547 Pa. at 198, 689 A.2d at 
904. Then, the Court, relying on its pr ecedent in 
Commonwealth v. Griffin, 537 Pa. 447, 644 A.2d 1167 
(1994), held that "claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
are not cognizable during post-trial pr oceedings, when the 
defendant has previously insisted on repr esenting himself." 
Appel II, 547 Pa. at 198, 689 A.2d at 904 (emphasis added). 
 
Nevertheless, the Court considered the substance of 
Appel's claim and rejected "Appel's ar gument that stand-by 
counsel must ignore the pleadings of their criminal 
defendant clients and undertake an exhaustive survey of 
the client's personal background in an attempt to establish 
incompetency." Id. at 202, 689 A.2d at 906. The Court 
accordingly concluded that Appel's standby counsel did not 
act unreasonably in respecting their client's wishes not to 
investigate his competency. 
 
The District Court recognized that because the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court recharacterized Appel's claim 
as arguing that "stand-by counsel" wer e ineffective and 
consistently referred to Kraft and Cr owe as only "stand-by 
counsel," it failed to adjudicate Appel's denial of counsel 
claim on the merits. See District Court Memorandum at 14- 
15. As the District Court stated, "[t]he state courts thus 
condoned Kraft's and Crowe's conduct based on the trial 
court's post-hoc finding that Appel was competent, when 
the relevant questions were whether they were counsel or 
stand-by counsel prior to June 20, 1986, and what they 
were obligated to do when faced with a potentially 
incompetent client on June 12, 1986, who might be unable 
to make the rational, strategic choices which Pennsylvania 
law accords to criminal defendants (including waiver of 
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counsel), and for whom a competency hearing had been 
scheduled by the trial judge for June 20, 1986." Id. at 15- 
16. 
 
Our reading of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opinion 
leads us to agree with the District Court that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court "never consider ed Appel's 
claim that the actions of Kraft and Crowe fr om June 12, 
1986, to June 20, 1986, constituted a constructive denial 
of counsel." Id. at 16. As the District Court stated, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court "failed to addr ess Appel's 
arguments that Kraft and Crowe wer e actually his counsel 
during the time leading up to the trial court's competency 
hearing." Id. While the allegations that Crowe and Kraft 
failed to investigate Appel's background ar e relevant to 
Appel's habeas claim before us, their r elevancy is not in the 
context of ineffective assistance of counsel, as the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court treated them, but in the 
constructive denial of counsel, the issue that the state 
courts did not consider. It is informative that throughout its 
opinion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court failed to cite to 
Cronic, the relevant Supreme Court case on constructive 
denial of counsel. 
 
It follows, as the District Court held, that "AEDPA's 
standards are inapplicable to Appel's constructive denial of 
counsel claim, and this court must examine, without 
`special heed to the underlying state court decision,' 
whether Appel was constructively denied his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel during the time befor e the trial 
court accepted his waiver of counsel." District Court 
Memorandum at 17. Therefore, the District Court did not 
err by conducting a de novo review of this claim. We will 
conduct a plenary review over questions of law and mixed 
questions of law and fact.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We take note that the District Court held in the alternative that 
Appel's claim could satisfy the requirements of S 2254(d), because the 
state court decision was an "unreasonable application" of clearly 
established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. See 
District Court Memorandum at 17 n.15. While this analysis exemplifies 
the District Court's thoroughness, we see no r eason to consider it as we 
have already held that that clause of S 2254(d) does not apply here. 
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B. The Issue Before the Habeas Court  
 
The Commonwealth argues that the District Court erred 
in analyzing the merits of Appel's claim under the Supreme 
Court's decision in Cronic, and contends that it should 
instead have analyzed Appel's claim pursuant to Strickland. 
In Cronic, counsel representing the defendant indicted on 
federal mail fraud charges withdrew shortly before trial and 
the district court appointed as a substitute a young real 
estate lawyer. However, the court allowed him only 25 days 
to prepare for trial even though it had taken the 
government four and a half years to investigate and review 
thousands of documents. It was a difficult case for the 
defense because two co-defendants agreed to testify for the 
government and their testimony proved that Cronic had 
conceived and directed the entire "check kiting" scheme. 
Cronic did not testify so as to avoid impeachment with a 
prior conviction nor did he put on a defense, but his 
counsel did cross-examine the government's witnesses. 
Cronic was convicted on 11 of the 13 counts and sentenced 
to 25 years imprisonment. The court of appeals r eversed 
because it inferred that Cronic's Sixth Amendment right to 
the effective assistance of counsel had been violated. See 
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 649-52. 
 
Although the Supreme Court did not agree that the 
circumstances in Cronic justified the inference drawn by 
the court of appeals, it is the Court's discussion of the 
circumstances in which there would be such a Sixth 
Amendment violation that stands at the center of the Cronic 
doctrine. The Court began its discussion with the statement 
that "[a]n accused's right to be repr esented by counsel is a 
fundamental component of our criminal justice system," id. 
at 653, and quickly explained this meant "the right to the 
effective assistance of counsel," id.  at 654. At stake is the 
defendant's right to assistance "for his defence." Id. (quoting 
U.S. Const. amend. VI). "If no actual `Assistance' `for' the 
accused's `defence' is provided, then the constitutional 
guarantee has been violated." Id. (quoting U.S. Const. 
amend VI). Further, "a trial is unfair if the accused is 
denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial." Id. at 659. 
 
In one of the key passages, the Court stated that"[t]he 
right to the effective assistance of counsel is . . . the right 
 
                                13 
  
of the accused to require the prosecution's case to survive 
the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing." Id. at 656. 
No specific showing of prejudice is r equired when counsel 
entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to such 
testing. In such an event, ineffectiveness of counsel is 
"properly presumed without inquiry into actual 
performance at trial." Id. at 661. 
 
Courts have found constructive denial of the right to 
counsel under Cronic where counsel offered no assistance 
to defendant at plea proceedings, see Childress v. Johnson, 
103 F.3d 1221, 1231 (5th Cir. 1997); acted as a mere 
spectator at defendant's sentencing, see Tucker v. Day, 969 
F.2d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 1992); failed to object to a directed 
verdict against the defendant, see Har ding v. Davis, 878 
F.2d 1341, 1345 (11th Cir. 1989); and deliberately stressed 
the brutality of his client's crime, see Osbor n v. Shillinger, 
861 F.2d 612, 628-29 (10th Cir. 1988). 
 
The Commonwealth contended at oral argument that 
Cronic is inapplicable because Appel had declined to be 
represented by counsel and invoked his right to represent 
himself under Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806 (1975). In 
Faretta, the Supreme Court examined the historical 
underpinnings of the right to self-repr esentation, and ruled 
that a court cannot "compel a defendant to accept a lawyer 
he does not want" if he voluntarily and intelligently chooses 
to represent himself. Id. at 833. The Court concluded that 
a defendant's right to self-representation is protected in the 
Sixth Amendment. 
 
We are not unaware that a trial court may believe that it 
is caught between the Scylla and Charybdis of Cr onic and 
Faretta. We acknowledge that the court must sometimes 
walk a narrow line between the Sixth Amendment 
requirement that a defendant be pr ovided with counsel and 
its requirement that a defendant be given the right of self- 
representation. This is not such a case because the issue is 
focused on the short period of time befor e the trial court 
accepted Appel's waiver of counsel. It is well-established 
that a waiver of the right to counsel is not ef fective until the 
court accepts that it is made voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 403 
(1977); see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (noting that the 
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defendant "was voluntarily exercising his informed free will" 
to decline representation by counsel); Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) (requiring a waiver of counsel to 
be "an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused"). 
 
Moreover, a defendant's waiver cannot be knowing or 
intelligent unless the defendant is competent. See Pate v. 
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966). Pennsylvania's own 
procedures provide that "[w]hen the defendant seeks to 
waive the right to counsel . . . , the judge shall ascertain 
from the defendant, on the record, whether this is a 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of counsel." Pa. 
R. Crim. P. 318(c) (renumbered Rule 121(C)). It follows that 
Faretta does not displace Appel's right to effective 
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment in the 
period before he was deemed competent to waive counsel 
on June 20, 1986. 
 
Kraft and Crowe were Appel's counsel between June 10, 
1986 and June 20, 1986. They were assigned to be Appel's 
attorneys on June 10, 1986 and entered appearances on 
his behalf. Under the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, once an attorney has entered an appearance 
with the court, "[c]ounsel for a defendant may not withdraw 
his or her appearance except by leave of court." Pa. R. 
Crim. P. 302(b) (renumbered Rule 120(C) and amended 
March 1, 2000, effective April 1, 2001). Moreover, as the 
District Court recognized, Kraft and Cr owe were not 
standby counsel for Appel until June 20, 1986, when the 
trial court accepted Appel's waiver. See  District Court 
Memorandum at 26; see also Pa. R. Crim P . 318(d) 
(allowing appointment of standby counsel after the court 
accepts a defendant's waiver of counsel) (renumbered Rule 
121(D)). The Commonwealth's reliance on Far etta does not 
relieve us of our obligation to examine whether Appel's 
constitutional rights were properly pr eserved before the 
trial court accepted his waiver. 
 
The Commonwealth next argues that the District Court 
should have examined Appel's claim under Strickland's 
ineffective assistance of counsel analysis rather than the 
constructive denial of counsel analysis of Cr onic. It 
contends that Appel cannot prove that his trial counsel's 
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alleged failures prejudiced the defendant, as required by 
Strickland. See Br. of Appellant at 47-52. 
 
Strickland, decided on the same day as Cronic, held that 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated if (1) 
"counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness," and (2) the "deficiencies in counsel's 
performance [were] prejudicial to the defense." Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 688-92. The Court further stated that"[j]udicial 
scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly 
deferential . . . that is, the defendant must overcome the 
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged 
action might be considered sound trial strategy." Id. at 689 
(citation and quotation omitted). 
 
Both Strickland and Cronic address the adequacy of 
counsel's performance. And it is indeed true that the 
majority of Sixth Amendment right to counsel cases are, 
and should be, analyzed under the ineffective assistance 
standard of Strickland which requires a showing of 
prejudice. See Childress, 103 F .3d at 1228 (noting that 
Strickland governs most right to counsel claims); United 
States v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938, 950 n.17 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(noting that the Cronic analysis should be used for 
"particularly egregious circumstances"). The District Court 
similarly recognized that Cronic should be applied 
"sparingly." District Court Memorandum at 22 (quotation 
omitted). 
 
The District Court was acutely aware of the distinction. 
The court, however, stated that "Appel claims that he was 
denied counsel -- not that he received inef fective assistance 
of counsel." Id. at 20 (capitalization omitted).5 Accordingly, 
we will limit our consideration to the issue on which the 
District Court focused -- whether Appel was constructively 
denied counsel in the period before the trial court accepted 
his waiver of counsel. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Appel argues that, in the alternative, we should affirm the District 
Court's order because he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel. However , it appears that argument was 
not advanced in the District Court and we see no r eason to consider it 
here. 
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C. Constructive Denial of Appel's Right to Counsel  
 
We turn finally to review the merits of the basis for the 
District Court's grant of the writ of habeas corpus. The 
District Court granted Appel's petition for habeas corpus 
based on its conclusion that Appel's Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel was constructively denied during the period from 
June 10, 1986 (when counsel was appointed) to June 20, 
1986 (when the trial court accepted his waiver of counsel 
and appointed Kraft and Crowe as standby counsel). 
 
The District Court viewed the Cronic precedent as 
applying "when counsel utterly failed to function as counsel 
by providing no assistance to the defendant." Id. at 23. It 
noted that other courts of appeals have applied Cronic in 
accordance with these principles, citing, inter alia, Rickman 
v. Bell, 131 F.3d 1150, 1157 (6th Cir . 1997) (applying 
Cronic when counsel "combined a total failure to actively 
advocate his client's cause with repeated expr essions of 
contempt for his client for his alleged actions"); Childress, 
103 F.3d at 1231 (applying Cronic  when counsel offered no 
advice to defendant at a plea hearing and conducted no 
investigation to assist the defendant); cf. T ippins v. Walker, 
77 F.3d 682, 686-87 (2d Cir. 1996) (pr esuming prejudice 
when defense counsel slept through a substantial portion of 
trial, thereby suspending the adversarial natur e of the 
process). 
 
Appel's competency hearing was a critical stage of his 
trial. The District Court noted that Kraft and Cr owe "had 
the obligation to act as counsel at Appel's competency 
hearing by subjecting the state's evidence of competency to 
`meaningful adversarial testing.' " District Court 
Memorandum at 27 (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659). And, 
in the dispositive finding, the District Court found "[t]he 
record is undisputed that they failed to do so; they did not 
investigate his background, speak to his family or friends, 
or obtain his health or employment recor ds." Id. We have 
examined the record and see no reason to disagree. The 
Commonwealth did not disagree in the District Court but 
stated at oral argument that Kraft and Cr owe did speak 
with Appel's parents between June 10 and June 20, 1986. 
However, both Kraft and Crowe testified that these 
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conversations concerned paying bills and handling 
property, not Appel's competency. 
 
Kraft and Crowe testified repeatedly at the state PCRA 
hearing that they believed they were not Appel's counsel in 
the short period before June 20, 1986. That r epetition 
prompted the court to remark during Kraft's testimony: 
 
       THE COURT: Well, I think Attorney Kraft has made 
       clear that she was not authorized as Mr. Appel's 
       attorney throughout this proceeding . . . There is no 
       need each time the question is asked to remind us that 
       you were not his attorney, we understand. 
 
App. II at 114. 
 
We see nothing in the record that disputes the following 
facts set forth in Appel's brief on appeal: 
 
        Believing that they were never Mr. Appel's counsel, 
       the attorneys never even offered to investigate and 
       never did any investigation of any type, r egarding the 
       offense or Mr. Appel's competency: they never spoke to 
       anyone or obtained any records about Mr . Appel's 
       background and history; they never asked anyone in 
       Mr. Appel's family about the offense or Mr. Appel's 
       background, although they knew how to contact Mr. 
       Appel's parents; they never asked Mr. Appel's girlfriend, 
       Yvonne Duggan, about the offense or Mr . Appel's 
       background, although they knew how to contact her; 
       they never spoke to any of Mr. Appel's co-workers, 
       although they knew where he had worked; they never 
       sought or obtained Mr. Appel's military r ecords, 
       although they knew he had been in the military and 
       had had problems there; they never looked into the 
       codefendant's views about Mr. Appel's mental state; 
       they never sought or obtained Mr. Appel's employment 
       records, although they knew that he had had problems 
       in his employment at the Lehigh County Jail; they 
       never sought or obtained from the prosecution any 
       police reports prior to the June 20, 1986 competency 
       decision; they never spoke to the police investigator 
       about what he had learned about Mr. Appel's mental 
       state. . . . 
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        In short, attorneys Kraft and Crowe, because they 
       did not believe they were counsel, never conducted any 
       investigation; did not provide Dr. Schwartz or the court 
       with any information about Mr. Appel; and did not 
       attempt to litigate the competency determination in 
       any way. Attorneys Kraft and Crowe testified that, 
       instead of investigation or acting as counsel in the 
       case, they did "personal things for Mr. Appel" such as 
       transferring car titles and making sure bills had been 
       paid. . . . They did nothing to investigate or pr epare for 
       the competency determination. They did not subject 
       the crucial competency determination in this capital 
       case to any adversarial testing. 
 
Br. of Appellee at 8-9 (emphasis in original). 
 
It follows that there is ample support for the District 
Court's conclusion that Kraft and Crowe "abandoned their 
duty to both the court and their client when they decided 
not to conduct any investigation" on Appel's competency. 
District Court Memorandum at 27. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the District Court 
misapplied the law by relying on Hull v. Fr eeman, 932 F.2d 
159 (3d Cir. 1991). In Hull, we held that an attorney 
abdicated his professional obligations by failing to contest 
his client's competency to stand trial when ther e were 
psychiatric reports of his client's incompetency. Notably, we 
were analyzing Hull's claims under the Strickland test for 
ineffective assistance of counsel. See id.  at 167-70. 
Nevertheless, the District Court here cited to Hull in 
support of its ruling that Kraft and Crowe failed to meet 
their obligations as Appel's counsel, amounting to a 
violation of Cronic. See District Court Memorandum at 27- 
28. Contrary to the Commonwealth's protestations, we find 
Hull instructive on this point. Though Kraft and Crowe did 
not possess the same type of evidence of their client's 
incompetency as did the defense counsel in Hull , their 
failure to make any investigation clearly pr evented them 
from discovering that such information did exist. 
 
At oral argument, the Commonwealth argued that an 
affirmance of the District Court's ruling that Appel was 
denied the assistance of counsel would encourage a spate 
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of similar claims by other defendants. We believe that 
scenario is unlikely. Counsel are not apt to abdicate their 
responsibility to conduct some preliminary investigation 
even when a defendant wishes to plead guilty, as the 
defendant's background may provide a basis to argue 
mitigating circumstances. Here, even a minimal inquiry 
would have disclosed from Appel's mother his strange 
behavior, his staring, suicide attempts, and prior incident of 
babbling incoherently on a staircase when he worked at the 
Lehigh County Jail; inquiry of his girlfriend would have 
disclosed his bizarre behavior, thr eat of suicide, belief that 
he was an agent for military intelligence; inquiry into 
Appel's employment at the Lehigh County Jail also would 
have uncovered Appel's history of bizarr e behavior, such as 
mumbling incoherently to a radio in a stairwell, claims that 
he had been involved in top secret spying operations, his 
appearance of being delusional and of having mental 
problems. See Br. of Appellee at 12-18. 
 
We are not suggesting that this evidence shows that 
Appel is or was incompetent on June 20, 1986. However, 
because counsel failed to make even a minimal inquiry they 
did not ascertain these background facts or pr esent them 
to Dr. Schwartz or the court. Indeed, Dr . Schwartz testified 
at the PCRA hearing that had she known about Appel's 
bizarre behavior, she would have made further inquiry. See 
PCRA Tr. 5/11/95, at 111-14 (testimony of Dr. Janet 
Schwartz). In the judicial experience of each member of this 
panel, none of which has less than 20 years on the bench, 
such default by counsel who do not believe that they are 
counsel has rarely, if ever, occurr ed. Therefore, we reject 
the Commonwealth's suggestion that we are opening a 
Pandora's Box. 
 
Nor do we believe it would impose an undue bur den on 
defense counsel to require some investigation into the 
defendant's competency, especially in a capital mur der case 
where the trial court has ordered a competency evaluation 
and hearing. As the District Court noted, defense counsel is 
not obligated "to develop frivolous arguments in favor of 
incompetency." District Court Memorandum at 30. But 
under the circumstances in this case, Appel's counsel 
should have investigated, advocated, or otherwise acted to 
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ensure that there was "meaningful adversarial testing." 
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659. In the wor ds of the District Court, 
Appel's counsel was "only required to act as an advocate -- 
to conduct a meaningful investigation into [the] defendant's 
competency and to present information gleaned from that 
investigation at [the] competency hearing, and to the 
evaluating psychiatrist, if the information suggests an 
alternative version of the truth about the defendant's 
competency." District Court Memorandum at 30. 
 
Therefore, we agree with the District Court's 
determination that Kraft and Crowe's failure to act in the 
period between June 10, 1986 and June 20, 1986, when 
the District Court held Appel competent to waive counsel, 
constituted a constructive denial of Appel's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. 
 
D. Remedy  
 
Having found Appel's Sixth Amendment rights violated, 
the District Court granted a writ of habeas corpus and 
vacated Appel's conviction and sentence but allowed the 
government to provide Appel with a new trial within 180 
days of the order. The Commonwealth ar gues on appeal 
that the appropriate remedy for a Cr onic violation would be 
to order a retrospective competency hearing to determine 
whether Appel was indeed competent to waive counsel in 
1986. However, the Commonwealth has been unable to cite 
to any case that would support ordering a r etrospective 
competency hearing instead of vacating Appel's conviction. 
 
In contrast, we have previously held that r etrospective 
competency hearings are not an appropriate remedy for 
Sixth Amendment violations. In Henderson v. Frank, 155 
F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 1998), we held that the defendant's lack 
of counsel at a pretrial suppression hearing violated his 
Sixth Amendment rights, a violation that could not"be 
remedied by merely ordering a new suppression hearing." 
Id. at 170. Citing Cronic, we stated that the violation 
"contaminated the entire criminal pr oceeding." Id. at 171. 
Similarly, we noted in Hull that the appr opriate remedy for 
ineffective assistance of counsel at a competency hearing 
was to vacate the guilty plea, not to order a new 
competency hearing. See Hull, 932 F.2d at 169. 
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Moreover, the Supreme Court has disapproved of 
retrospective hearings on competency. In Pate v. Robinson, 
383 U.S. 375 (1966), where the habeas petitioner did not 
receive a constitutionally adequate competency hearing, the 
Court stated: "It has been pressed upon us that it would be 
sufficient for the state court to hold a limited hearing as to 
[the petitioner's] mental competence at the time he was 
tried in 1959. If he were found competent, the judgment 
against him would stand. But we have previously 
emphasized the difficulty of retrospectively determining an 
accused's competence to stand trial." Id. at 387. 
 
The Supreme Court has consistently held ther e should be 
a new trial if there has been some constitutional defect 
regarding the defendant's competency. See, e.g., Drope v. 
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 183 (1975) (granting a new trial 
when trial court refused to conduct a hearing to determine 
the defendant's competence to stand trial); Pate , 383 U.S. 
at 386-87 (ordering a new trial for a defendant who did not 
receive an adequate competency hearing); Dusky v. United 
States, 362 U.S. 402, 403 (1960) (per curiam) (vacating the 
conviction after holding that there wer e insufficient facts to 
support the finding that petitioner was competent to stand 
trial and recognizing the "difficulties of retrospectively 
determining the petitioner's competency as of more than a 
year ago"). 
 
The right to assistance of counsel is "one of the 
safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to 
insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty." 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938). It follows that 
we agree with the District Court that "[t]he unconstitutional 
deprivation of counsel at Appel's competency hearing 
infected all later stages of his prosecution and rendered all 
subsequent proceedings against him void." District Court 
Memorandum at 33. Following the trial court's acceptance 
of Appel's waiver of counsel, Appel was without"the guiding 
hand of counsel at every later stage of the pr oceedings 
which eventually lead [sic] to his death sentence." Id. at 34. 
The Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent cited above 
supports the District Court's conclusion that "[t]he 
appropriate remedy for this constitutional violation . . . is, 
therefore, to vacate Appel's conviction and sentence and to 
award him a new trial." Id. 
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III. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We will therefore affirm not only the District Court's 
conclusion that Appel's Sixth Amendment right was 
violated but also its determination that the appropriate 
remedy is to grant a writ of habeas corpus vacating Appel's 
conviction and sentence and to allow the Commonwealth to 
provide Appel with a new trial. 
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